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A RELATIONAL APPROACH TO
THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
AND ITS LOSS
Deborah Tuerkheimer∗
INTRODUCTION
Battering is fundamentally different from violence between
non-intimates.1 Domestic violence is widely understood—outside
the law—as an ongoing pattern of conduct defined by both
physical and non-physical manifestations of power.2 Yet, by tacit
∗

Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; A.B.,
Harvard College, 1992; J.D., Yale Law School, 1996. This Article
condenses and updates the ideas first expressed in Deborah Tuerkheimer,
Crawford’s Triangle: Domestic Violence and the Right of Confrontation, 85
N.C. L. REVIEW 1 (2006). I am grateful to Laurence Busching, Richard
Friedman, Brooks Holland, Tom Lininger, Lois Lupica, Joan Meier, Robert
Pitler, Myrna Raeder, Frank Tuerkheimer, Jennifer Wriggins, and Melvyn
Zarr for their helpful comments on earlier incarnations of this piece, and to
Judith Lewis for her invaluable research assistance.
1
Violence between non-intimates is paradigmatic criminal conduct and
lies in contrast to domestic violence, which, in important respects, lies
outside the bounds of traditional criminal law structures. For a discussion of
the features that define “paradigmatic” crime, see Deborah Tuerkheimer,
Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to Criminalize
Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 971-74 (2004)
[hereinafter Remedying the Harm of Battering]. Although child abuse and
elder abuse share many of the dynamics distinguishing battering from
conventional crime, and much of the discussion which follows applies to
violence in intimate relationships generally, I focus here on adult partner
abuse and the law’s response to it.
2
Psychologist Mary Ann Dutton has elaborated on the dynamics of
domestic violence as follows:
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default to analogy and precedent, our legal system equates
domestic violence with paradigmatic non-domestic violence,3
resulting in an odd disconnect between the law and life outside
of it.
This observation is particularly true in the Sixth Amendment
context, where notions of domestic violence underlying
contemporary
Confrontation
Clause
jurisprudence
are
sufficiently inaccurate as to fatally undermine the coherence of
both doctrine and theory.4 As scholars, practitioners, and courts
struggle to discern the meaning of the Supreme Court’s recent
pronouncement in Davis v. Washington,5 my critique focuses on
Abusive behavior does not occur as a series of discrete events.
Although a set of discrete abusive incidents can typically be
identified within an abusive relationship, an understanding of the
dynamic of power and control within an intimate relationship
goes beyond these discrete incidents. To negate the impact of the
time period between discrete episodes of serious violence—a
time period during which the woman may never know when the
next incident will occur, and may continue to live with on-going
psychological abuse—is to fail to recognize what some battered
woman experience as a continuing “state of siege.”
Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence:
A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191,
1208 (2003) (quoting Sue Osthoff, Director, National Clearinghouse for the
Defense of Battered Women). For a more thorough discussion of the nature
of battering, see Tuerkheimer, Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note
1, at 962-69.
3
See supra note 1 (explaining term).
4
The jurisprudence is incoherent insofar as its defining construct cannot
be applied meaningfully in the domestic violence realm, though it may indeed
be compatible with paradigmatic crime. The irony is that, as a categorical
matter, battering prosecutions will most often present the need for trial
without the testimony of a victim. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers
After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 768 (2005) (“[R]ecent evidence
suggests that 80 to 85 percent of battered women will recant at some
point.”). See also Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle: Domestic
Violence and the Right of Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REVIEW 1, 14-18 (2006)
[hereinafter Crawford’s Triangle] (discussing causes and manifestations of
victim non-cooperation). If a framework for Confrontation Clause challenges
fails in these cases, in my view it cannot be seen as adequate.
5
126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
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the underlying conceptual framework as inherently flawed.
The Court has promulgated an invalid test for “testimonial
statements” by incorporating a model of discrete, episodic
violence that is incompatible with the ongoing nature of abuse.
In essence, the Court has defined the term in a manner that does
not and cannot measure what it purports to in domestic violence
cases.
In the discussion which follows, I examine cases and
commentary treating the right of confrontation in victimless
domestic violence prosecutions.6 My objective in doing so is to
expose the assumptions underlying the application of Crawford
v. Washington7 to the battering sphere. This Article argues that
the Court has failed to acknowledge the continuing course of
conduct that characterizes domestic violence.
A full appreciation of the dynamics of domestic abuse and
attention to the context of the relationship that embeds victim
and defendant results in what this Article will refer to as a
“relational approach” to Confrontation Clause analysis.8 This
Article develops the relational approach by analyzing the two
doctrinal questions that will continue to arise most frequently in
the post-Crawford era: (1) when is a statement testimonial, and
(2) when has a defendant forfeited his right of confrontation?
Part I critiques the Davis Court’s definition of “testimonial”
6

Many domestic violence victims become reluctant or unwilling to assist
with prosecutorial efforts after a batterer’s arrest, creating the need for
prosecution without reliance on a victim’s testimony, or so-called “victimless
prosecution.” Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle, supra note 4, at 2 n.3. I
use this term advisedly, as it tends to obscure the fact that someone was
indeed victimized by the conduct at issue in the case, notwithstanding her
absence from the trial. It seems to me that “victim absent” would be a
preferable way of describing prosecutions now referred to as “victimless.”
Nevertheless, to adhere to convention and avoid unnecessary confusion, I will
continue to use the accepted term.
7
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
8
My use of the word relational in this context is not derived from the
scholarly tradition of relational feminism. Rather, it is way of characterizing
an approach to understanding the Confrontation Clause that views the
alignment of relationships between accuser, accused, and state as central to
its descriptive and normative aspirations. See infra Part V.
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for its complete inattention to the dynamics of battering. This
Part argues that decontextualized determinations of exigency—
and continued adherence to an inapt dualism—will inevitably
skew the disposition of Confrontation Clause challenges. In
evaluating whether a hearsay statement is testimonial, the Court
has adopted a theoretical framework that posits a binary
relationship between “crying for help” and “providing
information” for investigatory purposes.9
However, in the domestic violence realm, the dichotomy is
false. By this contention, I mean to suggest more than that
officers and victims have “mixed motives” that are often
difficult to discern.10 Rather, from the perspective of battered
women, the meaning of “exigency”—a construct deeply
embedded in the now-reigning definition of testimonial—is
distinct from that experienced by victims of other types of
crimes.11 In order for the exigency confronting a battered
woman to be resolved, she must often provide information
regarding past violence; she does so in order to prevent
imminent violence. Thus, the two functions conceived of by
courts (“crying for help” and “providing information”) as
distinct, and indeed binary, are not only practically inseverable,
but are conceptually so as well. By failing to account for this
reality, the dominant judicial approach has resulted, and will
continue to result, in the classification as “testimonial” of many
statements by domestic violence victims that are, in fact, cries
for help in response to immediate danger.
Part II examines the lower courts’ treatment of the
testimonial question in Davis’ immediate aftermath in order to
9

See Davis, 126 S. at 2279.
Id. at 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (“In many, if not most, cases where police respond to a
report of a crime, whether pursuant to a 911 call from the victim or
otherwise, the purposes of an interrogation, viewed from the perspective of
the police, are both to respond to the emergency situation and to gather
evidence. Assigning one of these two ‘largely unverifiable motives,’ primacy
correct word here? requires constructing a hierarchy of purpose that will
rarely be present—and is not reliably discernible.”) (internal citation omitted).
11
For a more extended analysis of this proposition, see Deborah
Tuerkheimer, Exigency, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
10
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illustrate defects in the Court’s framework for classifying
testimonial hearsay. It must be conceded, however, that even a
properly contextualized analysis of the definitional question will
lead to the exclusion of out-of-court statements that, while
admissible in victimless prosecutions before Crawford, will now
be properly categorized as testimonial. New attention must
therefore be given to the rule of forfeiture by misconduct, which
precludes a defendant from asserting confrontation rights where
he is responsible for procuring the witness’ absence from trial.
As the advancement of forfeiture arguments in domestic violence
cases becomes increasingly commonplace,12 the doctrine—as yet,
undeveloped in the battering realm—must evolve.
Part III argues that judicial forfeiture determinations should
take into account the characteristics that distinguish domestic
violence from other types of criminal tampering. This Part
provides a conceptual roadmap for this doctrinal transformation
suggesting that as courts begin to formulate a forfeiture
framework applicable to domestic violence cases, reliance on
precedent and analogy inevitably will subvert the rule’s equitable
rationale. This Part reveals that the influence of batterers over
victims departs in important ways from the traditional witness
tampering paradigm; in most abusive relationships, “tampering”
conduct is inexorably bound up in the violent exercise of power
that is itself criminal. Without acknowledging the patterned
nature of domestic abuse, courts cannot correctly interpret the
meaning of forfeiture. Thus, fidelity to the theoretical
underpinnings of the doctrine demands new consideration of how
it applies to victimless domestic violence prosecutions.
Finally, Part IV offers a theory of how the preceding
discussion might help to conceptualize the meaning of the
confrontation right. While undermining the notion that ensuring
evidence “reliability” is the exclusive function of the right of
confrontation, Crawford erected no new governing theoretical
framework. In the face of this void, the need to articulate a
12

The Davis Court’s recent reiteration of the principle of forfeiture and
its dictum discussing evidentiary standards applicable to forfeiture hearings
will further accelerate the development of law in this area. See Davis, 126 S.
Ct. at 2279-80.
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normative vision of confrontation has never been more
compelling. This Part suggests that when the realities of
domestic violence are attended to, a new paradigm for
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence—one that is, in essence,
relational—can be discerned. Adopting a relational approach to
confrontation has the potential to transform how we think about
the value of confrontation in domestic violence prosecutions and
beyond.
I. DAVIS AND THE FALSE PRIMACY OF PAST “EVENTS”
The conceptual tension that underlies the definition of
testimonial hearsay derives from an uncritical acceptance of
what one court expressly termed “the dichotomy between a plea
of help and testimonial statements.”13 In the domestic violence
context this dichotomy is false. Often, a battered woman’s safety
depends entirely on the intervention of law enforcement: she
13

State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262, 1265 (Wash. 2004). In an important
article pre-dating Crawford, Richard Friedman and Bridget McCormack
describe the operative theoretical construct as follows:
Now consider statements made in 911 calls and to responding
police officers. A reasonable person knows she is speaking to
officialdom—either police officers or agents whose regular
employment calls on them to pass information on to law
enforcement, from whom it may go to the prosecutorial
authorities. The caller’s statements may therefore serve either or
both of two primary objectives—to gain immediate official
assistance in ending or relieving an exigent, perhaps dangerous,
situation, and to provide information to aid investigation and
possible prosecution related to that situation. In occasional cases,
the first objective may dominate—the statement is little more
than a cry for help—and such statements may be considered
nontestimonial . . . . The more the statement narrates events,
rather than merely asking for help, the more likely it is to be
considered testimonial.
Richard D. Friedman & Bridge McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA.
L. REV. 1171, 1241-42 (2002). The authors do not limit their discussion to
the domestic violence context, although much of their attention is directed
specifically at the problem referred to as “dial-in testimony” of domestic
violence victims. Id. at 1180-1200.
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needs police protection because without assistance the violence
will continue. Put differently, a domestic violence victim’s
safety may be wholly contingent on her communication with
police; her “narration of events” linked inexorably to
resolving—however temporarily—the danger posed by her
batterer.14 Unlike victims of episodic crimes, a battered woman
may “cry for help” because it is the only possible way for her to
experience a moment of safety, however brief.
The “cry for help” may sound much like a narration of
events because it is: a victim is describing battering that will, in
all likelihood, continue in the absence of some action by law
enforcement.15 From her perspective, if she does not describe
the crime to the police, it is simply not “over,” nor is she
safe.16 And even when she does recount the incident, assuming
14

See, e.g., People v. Mackey, 785 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
2004); State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2005), judgment vacated,
126 S. Ct. 2979 (2006).
15
The ongoing pattern of physical and non-physical conduct that
characterizes battering is often escalated by a victim’s attempt to increase her
control over her life. In my experience prosecuting and supervising domestic
violence cases in the New York County District Attorney’s Office, I found
this to be especially true of acts triggering the intervention of law
enforcement. See Martha M. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1991) (“[A]t
the moment of separation or attempted separation—for many women, the first
encounter with the authority of law—the batterer’s quest for control often
becomes most acutely violent and potentially lethal.”). Cf. Brief of Amici
Curiae National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. in Support of
Respondent at 7, Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) (Nos. 055224 and 05-5705), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 198, at *19 (“Pursuing
prosecution, thus, is not only an assertion of autonomy, it directly defies the
abuser’s control, exposing the victim to considerable risk of violence.”). By
asserting that violence will likely continue absent some action on the part of
law enforcement, I do not mean to imply that an arrest will, in all or even
most cases, bring about a permanent cessation of violence. See infra note 17
(acknowledging uncertainty regarding deterrent effects of arrest in domestic
violence cases). Rather, arrest provides battered women with a reprieve,
however temporary, that is of value for a variety of reasons.
16
See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae National Network to End Domestic
Violence, supra note 15, at 48 n.20 (“It is not uncommon for domestic
abusers to threaten their victims that they will kill them if they call the
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the police are able to make an arrest, there is every reason to
believe that⎯after a respite⎯the battering will continue.17 The
domestic violence victim’s exigency extends beyond what might
appear to an outside observer⎯or even to the “reasonable
person” unfamiliar with the culture of this particular battering
relationship18⎯to be the “end” of the criminal incident. The
exigency she experiences requires a narration of past events in
order to resolve the immediate danger they precipitated. This
reality fatally undermines judicial reasoning predicated on the
“crying for help” versus “providing information to law
enforcement” rubric.
Rather than reject this reasoning, the Supreme Court recently
reified it in Davis.19 According to Justice Scalia, writing for the
police . . . .”) (citing Director of Milwaukee County District Attorney’s
Office Domestic Violence Unit).
17
Domestic violence victims are rarely (if ever) able to predict with
certainty the impact of law enforcement involvement on future abuse. See
generally note 15. Indeed, there is considerable controversy regarding the
deterrent effects of arrest in battering relationships. See, e.g., Joan Zorza,
Must We Stop Arresting Batterers?: Analysis and Policy Implications of New
Police Domestic Violence Studies, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 929 (1994); Eve
Buzawa & Carl Zuawa, Arrest is No Panacea, CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON
FAMILY VIOLENCE 337 (Gelles & Loseke eds., 1993). See also ELIZABETH
SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 184-88 (2000)
(discussing broader implications of mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution
policies).
Accepting as a phenomenological matter that a constant danger
characterizes the lives of many battered women does not mean as a practical
matter that the period of exigency relevant to the Confrontation Clause
analysis should be considered to extend indefinitely. As is true of most
difficult criminal law questions, lines must be drawn. See Deborah W.
Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 269, 274 (2002) (remarking that “[t]here are many line-drawing
dilemmas throughout the criminal law”). Ideally, these lines are drawn in a
manner that corresponds to underlying empirical realities.
18
After Davis, the focus of judicial inquiry now would seem to be on
the “circumstances objectively indicating . . . the primary purpose of the
interrogation,” although “it is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements,
not the interrogator’s questions” that remain at the heart of the Confrontation
Clause. 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
19
See generally id.
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majority, a statement is nontestimonial if uttered “in the course
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”20 Conversely, if the
“primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove
past
events
potentially
relevant
to
later
criminal
prosecution”⎯i.e., there is “no ongoing emergency”⎯a
resulting statement is testimonial.21 Where a victim is in need of
police action to confront the danger presented by her batterer—a
danger that, given the continuing nature of the violence, is no
less “exigent” simply because one prosecutable crime has
already occurred22—the narrative of events necessary to trigger
law enforcement assistance is classified as testimonial hearsay.
In this manner, the passage of an “event” essentially
becomes one proxy for the resolution of exigency. Yet tensions
within the opinion regarding what counts as an “event” are left
20

Id. at 2273.
Id. Adopting this binary standard, the Court affirmed the state court
ruling in Davis, holding that the “primary purpose” of the 911 call “was to
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency”; but it reversed the
state court holding in Hammon, classifying the challenged statements to the
responding police officers as “part of an investigation into possibly criminal
past conduct.” Id. at 2278. By totemically incanting the language of crisis—
“ongoing emergency,” “imminent danger,” “call for help against bona fide
physical threat,” “present emergency,” “frantic answers,” “environment that
was not . . . . safe”—the Court purported to differentiate Michelle
McCrotty’s words from Amy Hammon’s and to justify its definition of the
latter as testimonial. Id. at 2276-78. Since “Amy’s statements were neither a
cry for help nor the provision of information enabling officers immediately to
end a threatening situation,” id. at 2279, their admission at trial constituted a
violation of the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights.
22
Indeed, given the escalating nature of domestic violence, where one
crime has just occurred, a victim’s circumstances may be even more
“exigent.” See Mahoney, supra note 15, at 5-6 (“[a]t the moment of
separation or attempted separation—for many women, the first encounter with
the authority of law—the batterer’s quest for control often becomes most
acutely violent and potentially lethal.”) Cf. Brief of Amici Curiae National
Network to End Domestic Violence, supra note 15, at *19 (“Pursuing
prosecution, thus, is not only an assertion of autonomy, it directly defies the
abuser’s control, exposing the victim to considerable risk of violence”).
21
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unresolved by the majority’s unwillingness to concede that the
concept is subject to interpretation. The Court leaps to an
analysis premised on tense—that is, on whether the “event” is
past or present⎯without pausing to consider what must have
passed for a statement to be considered testimonial. In this way,
the Court’s employment of a seemingly neutral term (“event”)
functions to conceal its outcome-determining effect. The
assumption that “events” have either happened or “are actually
happening” obscures the utter subjectivity of this determination,
begging the question of what qualifies as an “event.”
If “event” were defined as narrowly as possible—i.e., as the
infliction of physical injury—it might be possible to identify
when an event had terminated. While a number of passages in
the opinion suggest that the Court is flirting with adopting this
constricted view (by references to “past criminal events” and the
like), it ultimately concludes—as it must—that “event” must be
defined more broadly, at the very least, to encompass “a
threatening situation” or “ongoing emergency.” After all, Davis
already had left the home moments before McCrotty, the victim,
described the assault to the 911 operator.23 Yet somehow, the
Court is able to view her as “speaking about events as they were
actually happen[ing].”24
Beyond the ambiguity surrounding the device of “event,”
Davis rests on the fallacy that exigency can be discerned without
reference to context.25 The Court’s treatment of Hammon v.
23

See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2271 (2006); State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844,
846 (Wash. 2005).
24
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276.
25
In contrast, the opinion of Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment
in Davis and dissenting in Hammon, expressly contemplates the dynamics of
domestic violence. Consider the following passage:
[T]he fact that the officer in Hammon was investigating Mr.
Hammon’s past conduct does not foreclose the possibility that
the primary purpose of his inquiry was to assess whether Mr.
Hammon constituted a continuing danger to his wife, requiring
further police presence or action. It is hardly remarkable that
Hammon did not act abusively towards his wife in the presence
of the officers and his good judgment to refrain from criminal
behavior in the presence of police sheds little, if any, light on
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Indiana, the consolidated companion case to Davis, is instructive
in this regard.26 Hammon involved the admissibility of a
statement made by Amy Hammon to a police officer responding
to the crime scene. The statement relayed information regarding
an assault by the victim’s husband. By purporting to differentiate
Michelle McCrotty’s words from those of Amy Hammon,27 the
Court justified its definition of the latter as testimonial and the
former as non-testimonial. In some respects, this result is not
surprising. After all, Michelle McCrotty is more readily
analogized to victims of paradigmatic crime:28 Her attacker had
just recently fled, while Amy Hammon’s was still in the house
during the police investigation. But this does not mean that
exigency can only be experienced as it was by Michelle
McCrotty. Amy Hammon’s story is not unlike those of countless
battered women unable to communicate with law enforcement
“about events as they [are] actually happening.”29 Yet the
whether his violence would have resumed had the police left
without further questioning, transforming what the Court
dismisses as “past conduct” back into an “ongoing emergency.”
Id. at 2284-85.
26
Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
27
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278-79.
28
Apropos of this observation, the Court’s reference to the 1779 English
case of King v. Brasier is curious. See id. at 2277. By suggesting that a
young rape victim’s “screams for aid as she was being chased by her
assailant” would properly be deemed nontestimonial, the Court seems willing
to consider the possibility that safety—as opposed to the current infliction of a
crime—is the relevant construct. What eludes the Court is the extent to which
the dynamics of domestic violence raise safety concerns that are distinct from
those presented by paradigmatic crime. A domestic violence victim may, in
effect, be screaming for aid as she is being functionally chased by her
assailant; yet provided the physical assault has ended, the Court would
presumably characterize the statement as one which described past events and
was, therefore, testimonial.
29
Id. at 2276. Hershel Hammon apparently broke the telephone during
his attack on his wife. Id. at 2272. For obvious reasons, it is quite common
for batterers to destroy or disable the telephone during episodes of acute
physical violence. Even if a phone is in working order during an attack, it
should come as no surprise that victims are rarely able to make a call to 911
in the midst of a beating.
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Court’s inability (or unwillingness) to contemplate her
perspective allowed it to proclaim with certainty: “It is entirely
clear from the circumstances that the interrogation was part of
an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct.”30 As “there
was no emergency in progress”31 (apparently because the
responding officer “heard no arguments or crashing and saw no
one throw or break anything”32) and “there was no immediate
threat”33 once the officers arrived, it was clear to the Court that
“the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of the interrogation
was to investigate a possible crime.”34 And thus, Amy Hammon
was “cast . . . in the unlikely role of a witness.”35
The portion of Davis treating Hammon may well be
criticized for its application of the Court’s newly articulated
definition of testimonial to the facts. But Amy Hammon could
not “seek aid” without “telling a story about the past.” (After
all, the police could do nothing to protect her from her husband
were Amy simply to have requested assistance because she
feared him.) My contention, therefore, is that the Court’s test is
inherently defective.36 By equating the past commission of a
crime with the resolution of exigency—in essence, by
propounding the primacy of tense37—the Court negates the

30

Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2278 (2006).
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
See id. at 2277. This language comes from the portion of the opinion
where the Court, rejecting Davis’ Confrontation Clause challenge, dismisses
the argument that Michelle McCrotty’s statement was testimonial. Id. The
Court correctly observes that McCrotty’s “ex parte communication” was not
“aligned” with “[its] courtroom analogues,” concluding that “[n]o ‘witness’
goes into court to proclaim an emergency and seek help.” Id.
36
See supra note 4.
37
See, e.g., Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279 (“McCrotty’s present-tense
statements showed immediacy; Amy’s narrative of past events was delivered
at some remove in time from the danger she described.”). See also supra
notes 23-24 and accompanying text (critiquing ambiguity surrounding Court’s
use of “event”).
31
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realities of battering.38
The definition of testimonial embodies assumptions about the
nature of crime that are false in the battering realm.
Incorporating a model of discrete, episodic physical violence that
is incompatible with ongoing, multi-dimensional abuse, the
Court formulates a standard for classifying testimonial hearsay
that cannot be truly mapped onto domestic violence cases. Faced
with the task of implementing a meaningless construct, judges
are left with only unattractive options. They may grapple with
the messy truth of ongoing emergencies—thereby confronting the
inherent unworkability of the standard announced by Davis, and
the inevitably ad hoc nature of decisions purporting to
implement it. Alternatively, they may ignore the contextualized
nature of ongoing emergencies, thereby maintaining the illusion
of a rule by law (not judges), but at the cost of jurisprudential
integrity.
II. AFTER DAVIS
It is still too early to predict judicial reaction to the new
regime. Nevertheless, cases decided in the immediate wake of
Davis suggest lower court resistance to the Court’s tacit equation
of battering with other types of crime.39 The decisions treating
38

One way of addressing the problem I am identifying here would be to
define domestic violence more accurately in the criminal code; that is, to
criminalize the ongoing, patterned exercise of power and control that is
battering. I have proposed such a statute, and explained at length the
limitations of the current criminal law’s incident-based physical injuryfocused response to domestic violence. See generally, Tuerkheimer,
Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note 1; Deborah Tuerkheimer,
Renewing the Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence: An Assessment Three
Years Later, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 1617, on file with author) (discussing relationship between Court’s recent 6th
Amendment jurisprudence and proposed substantive criminal law reform).
39
As of November 17, 2006, approximately 140 lower court decisions
have cited Davis, although a number of these citations simply reflect remand
orders, rather than treatment of Davis on the merits. (This figure also does
not include grant, vacate and remand orders issued by the United States
Supreme Court.) About a quarter of these cases involve prosecutions for
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on-scene statements to responding police officers mostly have
determined that the hearsay is non-testimonial.40 These cases are
more significant for what their application of Davis reveals
about the test itself, and the ways in which courts may attempt
to navigate its failings, than for their outcomes.
The case of Vinson v. State41 is illustrative of what might be
seen as a judicial inclination to apply Davis’ test in a manner
that more adequately accounts for the dynamics of battering than
does the Davis opinion itself.42 In Vinson, the police responded
domestic violence. See, e.g., State v. Ly, No. A05-1106, 2006 Minn. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 853 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2006), State v. Mancini, No.
A05-1910, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 859 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 8,
2006), State v. Vinson, Nos. 01-05-00784-CR and 01-05-00785-CR, 2006
Tex. App. LEXIS 7036 (Tex. App. Aug. 10, 2006), State v. Rodriguez, 722
N.W.2d 136 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2006).
40
See, e.g., State v. Ly, No. A05-1106, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 853 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2006), State v. Mancini, No. A051910, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 859 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2006),
State v.Vinson, Nos. 01-05-00784-CR and 01-05-00785-CR, 2006 Tex. App.
LEXIS 7036 (Tex. App. Aug. 10, 2006), State v. Rodriguez, 722 N.W.2d
136 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2006). Interestingly, the designation of 911 calls has
arisen with less frequency. But see Jackson v. State, 931 So. 2d 1062, 1063
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (classifying with little analysis statement as nontestimonial since it “described events as they were actually happening”);
Santacruz v. State, No. 14-05-00227-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 7789, at *8
(Tex. App. Aug. 31, 2006) (holding some portions of call deemed
testimonial, because “there was apparently less, if any, threat of imminent
danger while the call was being placed” from victim’s mother’s house after
victim was able to leave crime scene).
41
No. 01-05-00784-CR, No. 01-05-00785-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS
7036, at *1 (Tex. App. Aug. 10, 2006).
42
See also Mancini, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 859, at *14
(“based on [the domestic violence victim’s] emotional state and the informal
nature of the conversation with the officer, we conclude that a reasonable,
objective witness would not contemplate that the statements to the responding
officer would be used in a later trial”); Ly, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS
853, at **9-10 (finding statements concededly similar to those defined as
testimonial in Davis deemed non-testimonial because they were given shortly
after the police found domestic violence victim bleeding, because officers
“were still attempting to determine who was involved,” and because she “was
not cooperating with police”).
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to the scene “within 10 to 15 minutes” of a 911 hang-up call
and were told by the victim, who appeared to have recent
injuries, that she had been assaulted by her boyfriend.43 Soon
after, the defendant entered the room, where he remained during
the course of much of the ensuing conversation between the
police and the victim.44 All of the victim’s statements were
deemed non-testimonial.45
With respect to the victim’s initial description of the
incident, the Vinson court, noting the victim’s “bloodied
appearance,” and that “the deputy knew that, only minutes
before, a woman in that same apartment had been yelling for
police assistance while a man denied that any problem existed,”
concluded that “the deputy’s asking only what had happened was
tantamount to his having asked whether an emergency existed or
whether [the victim] needed assistance.”46 Citing Davis, the
court emphasized that “[t]he Confrontation Clause does not
prohibit questioning when, as here, its purpose, viewed
objectively, is to ascertain if there is an ongoing emergency.”47
In classifying the deputy’s subsequent questioning of the
complainant (“the extent and formality of which is not
revealed”), the court viewed the defendant’s sweaty, shirtless,
and “very excited” appearance, as well as his interaction with
the injured victim (i.e., his “implicit order” that she “answer in
a certain way so that he would not be taken to jail”) as an
“indicat[ion] that the ‘elicited statements were necessary to be
able to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to
learn . . . what had happened in the past.’”48 Thus, in Vinson,
43

Vinson, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 7036, at *3.
The record was “somewhat unclear as to exactly when appellant was
removed from the apartment,” but the court interprets the evidence to suggest
that the defendant was present when all of the challenged statements were
made. Id., at *6 n.3. For the possible significance of this observation, see
infra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing perpetrator presence as
possibly evolving proxy for emergency).
45
Id., at **22-24.
46
Id., at *23.
47
Id.
48
Id. at *24 (citing Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2276 (2006))
44
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the court was able to find an outlet for the pressure created by a
doctrinal framework incompatible with the facts presented by a
typical battering case.
The opinion in State v. Rodriguez49 similarly reflects what
may be a willingness on the part of the lower courts to adapt
Davis to the realities of domestic violence.50 At issue in
Rodriguez were statements made by a domestic violence victim
to the police when officers first responded to the scene and on
the day following that initial interaction. In finding the
statements describing the past assault to be non-testimonial, the
court emphasized that the victim was not “motivated by anything
other than [a] desire to get help and secure safety,” and that her
“trauma” belied the notion that she had a “conscious
expectation” that her words would later be used against the
defendant.51 Statements made to the police the following day
were also deemed nontestimonial, since the defendant—who,
unbeknownst to police, was present at the scene at the time of
the questioning—“was . . . still a severe threat to [the victim’s]
safety.”52
Again, it is too soon to forecast with certainty whether, and
how, lower courts will make workable a framework that cannot
be meaningfully applied to the facts presented by a typical
domestic violence case.53 That said, consider the possibility that
a perpetrator’s presence at the crime scene at the time the
(emphasis in original). Testimony by the deputy that “the scene did not feel
safe until after appellant had been secured and back-up had arrived” also
impacted the court’s determination. Id. at *29.
49
722 N.W.2d 136 (Wis. App. Ct 2006).
50
Given the relatively small sample size of written opinions involving
domestic violence and treating Davis to date, my assessment of how the
lower courts may be negotiating its defects is necessarily tentative.
51
Rodriguez, 722 N.W.2d at 148.
52
Id. After the police left the scene the previous day, the defendant
returned home and attempted to stab the victim and her child. See id. at 141.
53
Without specifically identifying the fundamental incoherence of the
Davis test, one court has observed that “within the context of the fact patterns
before the Court, the Davis Court crafted some diffuse guidelines which,
because of the Court’s circumlocution, we must now attempt to distill into
practical rules.” State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 319 (W. Va. 2006).
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challenged statements are made might generally become
accepted as a proxy for an “ongoing emergency,” and the
perpetrator’s absence from the scene viewed as presumptive
evidence that a crisis has been resolved.54 Under this rubric, the
ongoing nature of battering would, to an extent, be
acknowledged and employed to somewhat mitigate Davis’
shortcomings.
It should be emphasized that any such mitigation would be
partial: a batterer’s departure from a crime scene (often in
response to a victim’s call to police) hardly means that the
danger of imminent harm to the victim has dissipated; absent
arrest, in many cases, the threat remains real. And yet, lower
court recognition that “ongoing emergencies” in domestic
violence cases encompass situations in which⎯notwithstanding
police presence—a batterer is still on the scene when the victim
recounts what occurred would represent a significant departure
from the Supreme Court’s limited understanding of the dynamics
of domestic abuse.
If courts manipulate Davis to allow for a more empiricallybased classification of hearsay as testimonial/nontestimonial,
perhaps the ultimate impact of the decision may be largely
conceptual. But it would be premature to reach this conclusion.
Indeed, the Court’s orders granting certiorari, vacating the
judgment, and remanding cases for further proceedings in Davis’
immediate aftermath do not bode well for judicial reasoning

54

Compare, e.g., State v. Vinson, Nos. 01-05-00784-CR and 01-0500785-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 7036, at *27 (Tex. App. Aug. 10, 2006)
(mentioning specifically perpetrator’s presence and behavior as indicating an
“ongoing and dangerous situation”), with Mechling, 633 S.E.2d at 323
(noting that “the defendant had clearly departed the scene” when the victim
was questioned, and concluding that the officers’ questioning of the victim
“was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct”). See also
Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 883 N.E.2d 549, 561 (Mass. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2982 (2006) (“[B]y the time the officers arrived, although
the complainant remained upset, the situation had diffused. The testifying
officer stated that he was informed the assailant was no longer present.
Nothing in the record indicates that his questioning of the complainant was
designed to secure the scene.”).
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predicated on an accurate perception of battering.55 (The
domestic violence cases that fall into this category resulted in the
classification of on-scene statements as nontestimonial and
effectively undermined the notion that an emergency is over
when the beating ends.56) While many lower courts will continue
to embrace the false dualisms upon which Davis was erected, in
all likelihood, an uneasy judicial equilibrium will be reached;
one which reflects but somewhat moderates the core defects of
Davis.
Regardless of how the contortions manifest themselves, the
“ongoing emergency” framework will continue to distort
analysis of the threshold definitional question. Moreover, even if
courts were to adopt the contextualized approach that I have
suggested, there undoubtedly will be hearsay that is properly
defined as testimonial.57 Since some theoretical divergence is
55

This type of order is issued only when “intervening developments . . .
reveal a reasonable probability that the decision below rests upon a premise
that the lower court would reject if given the opportunity for further
consideration, and where it appears that such a redetermination may
determine the ultimate outcome of the litigation.” Lawrence v. Chater, 516
U.S. 163, 167 (1996).
56
See, e.g., People v. Thomas, No. A104336, 2005 WL 2093065, at *5
(Cal. App. 1st Dist. Aug. 31, 2005) (finding that victim made statements
“shortly after the incident, while she was crying and frightened, and
described the beating and the circumstances that immediately led up to it;”
officer “was responding to a report of a crime and trying to find out what
had happened and who was responsible”); State v. Warsame, 701 N.W.2d
305, 312 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that victim, who was “on her way
to the police station near her house when she encountered [police] . . .
explained that all of the phone lines at her house had been cut;” because
“[h]er assailant was still at large, and she was injured,” it was “evident” to
the court that “she was seeking police protection and assistance”); State v.
Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 814 (Minn. 2005) (mentioning that victim was
“primarily concerned” about the defendant’s “ability to harm [her] in the
future, and not with the criminal penalties that he might face for his actions
that night.”).
57
It may be that the discrepancy between what an evidentiary code
requires and what the testimonial approach to confrontation demands has
grown wider, particularly in the realm of domestic violence prosecution.
When considering the scope of this discrepancy, it is worth noting the recent
expansions of hearsay exceptions often used in victimless prosecution. For
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inevitable—and because, as a practical matter, the wholesale
judicial rejection of familiar templates seems unlikely—the next
frontier for the victimless prosecution of domestic violence is
forfeiture.
III. EVOLVING FORFEITURE
A criminal defendant whose wrongdoing58 has procured the
absence of his victim at trial59 is deemed to have forfeited his
right to confrontation.60 This rule—expressly “approved” by the
Court in both Crawford61 and, more recently in Davis62—
instance, California and Oregon have “ad hoc hearsay exceptions directed
toward domestic violence victims” that allow certain statements of a declarant
describing the infliction of physical injury or threat of physical injury against
her provided the statement was made close in time to the incident. Myrna
Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford’s Impact on
Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK L. REV. 311, 353
(2005). See also CAL. EVID. CODE. §1370(a)(1) & (3) (West 2001); OR.
REV. STAT. §40.460(26)(a)(2002).
58
“Wrongful conduct obviously includes the use of force and threats,
but it has also been held to include persuasion and control by a defendant, the
wrongful nondisclosure of information, and a defendant’s direction to a
witness to exercise the fifth amendment privilege.” Steele v. Taylor, 684
F.2d 1193, 1201 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1053 (1983). See
infra notes 73-80 and accompanying text for further discussion of defining
wrongdoing in the domestic violence context.
59
See infra note 91 (discussing unavailability analysis meaningfully
applied to domestic violence cases).
60
“Some courts speak of the defendant as having waived the
confrontation right, but this is inaccurate: It is not necessarily so that an
accused who has acted in the ways described here as knowingly, intelligently,
and deliberately relinquished the right.” Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation
and the Definition of Chutzpah, 31 ISR. L. REV. 506 (1997) [hereinafter
Confrontation].
61
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (citing Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)). The Court’s acceptance of the rule of
forfeiture by wrongdoing, and state court forfeiture decisions following
Crawford, are not without their critics. See, e.g., James P. Flanagan,
Confrontation, Equity, and the Misnamed Exception for “Forfeiture” by
Wrongdoing, 14 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1193 (2006).
62
See supra note 12 (noting Davis’ reiteration of the vitality of the
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”extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable
grounds,”63 precluding an accused from “complain[ing] about
the consequences of his own conduct.”64 A judicial finding of
forfeiture results in the admission at trial of out-of-court
statements that would otherwise be excluded pursuant to the
Confrontation Clause.
Crawford’s testimonial approach to hearsay⎯and, more
generally, its “restoration” of the Confrontation Clause
protection65—instantly creates the prospect of a newly robust
forfeiture doctrine,66 and provides an impetus for its reenvisioning.67 As a consequence of the Court’s unequivocal
forfeiture doctrine).
63
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
64
See Friedman, Confrontation, supra note 60, at 516. Richard
Friedman has stated:
The proper basis for this principle is not, as some courts have
suggested it is, the broad dictum that no one should profit by his
own wrong. As an ideal, that is probably true, but in some cases
exclusion of the evidence on confrontation grounds will not be
necessary to guarantee that the accused does not profit by his
own wrong, and in some cases such exclusion will not be
sufficient to guarantee that result . . . . A more satisfying
explanation may be that the accused that should not be heard to
complain about the consequences of his own conduct. Thus, the
accused ought not be able to cause exclusion of the secondary
evidence on the ground that he has been unable to confront and
examine the declarant when his own conduct accounts for that
inability.
Id.
65
See Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court
Decision Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5
(2004).
66
As Myrna Raeder observes, “Crawford virtually invited prosecutors to
raise claims of forfeiture when facing Confrontation Clause challenges.”
Raeder, supra note 57, at 361.
67
In contrast to the abundance of cases treating the testimonial question,
post-Crawford forfeiture case law is still remarkably undeveloped. In my
view, the discrepancy is reflective of the practical challenge of recalibrating
understandings of the bench and prosecutorial bar with respect to how
constitutional forfeiture applies to domestic violence cases. It also suggests
that this is a uniquely opportune moment for considered reflection on how
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“decoupling”68 of the constitutional right from the evidentiary
code,69 constitutional forfeiture must be given its own doctrinal
space.70 Indeed, the dramatically changed approach to the
best to effect forfeiture’s normative potential in a new jurisprudential era.
68
Raeder, supra note 57, at 363.
69
When considering the introduction of hearsay statements against a
criminal defendant in a post-Crawford era, it is important to bear in mind
that, while evidentiary admissibility does not dictate constitutionality, neither
does constitutional acceptability resolve evidentiary issues.
70
See Raeder, supra note 57, at 363 (“In my view, we need to separate
the forfeiture hearsay exception from the constitutional forfeiture doctrine.”).
Since Davis was decided, a number of courts have reiterated that
constitutional forfeiture—unlike its evidentiary counterpart (codified at FED.
R. EVID. 804(b)(6))—does not require specific intent to procure a witness’
trial absence. See, e.g., State v. Jensen, No. 2004AP2481-CR, 2007 WL
543053, at *12-14 (Wis. 2007) (rejecting argument that specific intent
requirement applies to constitutional forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine);
People v. Giles, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 1913, at *32 (Cal. 2007) (“[F]orfeiture
principles can and should logically and equitably be extended to . . . cases in
which an intent-to-silence element is missing.”). See also State v. Brooks,
No. W2004-02834-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 668, at *26
(Aug. 31, 2006) (“[U]nlike the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the
hearsay rule, a defendant’s intent is irrelevant with respect to the forfeiture
by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause”); Mechling, 633
S.E.2d 311, infra note 53. Cf. People v. McClain, No. 6302/02, 2006 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 2013, at *12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 10, 2006) (holding that the
rule of forfeiture “simply provides that by killing another, a defendant
forfeits his or her right to raise a confrontation clause challenge”); People v.
Jackson, Crim. No. B183306, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7544, at *13
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2006) (“Because [the victim’s] unavailability was
caused by [the defendant’s] intentional criminal act, [the defendant] cannot be
heard to complain that he was deprived of the opportunity to confront and
cross-examine him.”). See also State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 842 (N.M. Ct.
App.), cert. granted, 146 P.3d 809 (N.M. 2006). In Romero, a prosecution
for murder of the defendant’s former wife, the appellate court noted its
disagreement with the state Supreme Court precedent holding that proof of
Confrontation Clause forfeiture requires a showing of a specific intent to
procure the witness’ absence. The intermediate court remarked, “we suspect
that our Supreme Court may not have fully considered the pros and cons of
imposing the intent to silence requirement in all cases involving forfeiture by
wrongdoing.” Id. at 854. The New Mexico Supreme Court has granted
certiorari to review the decision and specifically to revisit the boundaries of
constitutional forfeiture. See State v. Romero, 113 P.3d 346 (N.M. 2005); E-
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Confrontation Clause means that the forfeiture doctrine also
must be conceptualized anew.
The need for this reexamination of forfeiture occasioned by
Crawford is particularly critical in domestic violence cases,
where the ongoing course of conduct which characterizes
abusive relationships undermines both evidentiary71 and classic
constitutional forfeiture analysis.72 Without an appreciation of
how battering is different from other types of crime, judicial
decision-making—which tends to default to reason by way of
precedent and analogy73—will invariably fall short.74 Thus,
defining the contours of a constitutional forfeiture doctrine with
meaning in the domestic violence realm requires an evolution in
judicial reasoning.
Courts may be beginning to recognize this imperative. For
instance, in State v. Mechling,75 the West Virginia Supreme
Court, in remanding a domestic violence conviction for a
determination on forfeiture grounds, noted that “[a]n accused’s
coercion or intimidation of a victim of domestic violence so as
to trigger forfeiture can take many forms,” including pre-charge
conduct, conduct not specifically directed at procuring trial
absence, and conduct which can only be understood when
viewed in context.76 Predicated on an understanding of the
nature of battering and the ways in which it is distinct from
other types of crime, the Mechling court’s observations may be
mail from Joel Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General, New Mexico Attorney
General’s Office, to Deborah Tuerkheimer, Associate Professor of Law,
University of Maine School of Law (June 29, 2006, 14:31:00 EST) (on file
with author).
71
See Crawford’s Triangle, supra note 4, at Part III.A.
72
See Crawford’s Triangle, supra note 4, at Part III.B.
73
Cf. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law,
100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1314 (1991) (noting that “legal method traditionally
proceeds by analogy and distinction”).
74
By “falling short,” I mean that in victimless domestic violence
prosecutions, the equitable promise of forfeiture will remain largely
unfulfilled. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (noting normative
underpinnings of forfeiture doctrine).
75
See generally Mechling, 633 S.E.2d at 311.
76
Id. at 326.
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viewed as an effort to begin to develop a forfeiture doctrine
grounded in reality.
For judges to apply the principle of forfeiture faithfully to
domestic violence cases requires acknowledgment that, as a
general proposition,77 abuse victims are absent from trials for
reasons different from those that tend to cause other types of
witnesses to become unavailable. The divergence of battering
from a stranger violence template challenges existing
conceptions of forfeiture in two fundamental ways. First, in
many battering relationships, abuse occurring prior to the crime
for which the defendant is being tried causes the victim’s noncooperation. Second, what causes a victim to absent herself from
trial may not be readily identified as “misconduct.” Put
differently, forfeiture in domestic violence cases raises questions
of chronology and of how to discern a defendant’s misconduct.
After elaborating on each inquiry, I will address how forfeiture
in domestic violence cases might be proven.
A. The Problem of Time
Often, a domestic violence victim’s absence from trial is
caused by conduct on the part of the defendant that has occurred
prior to, or even during, the commission of the crime with
which he is charged.78 Threats to harm, or even kill a woman if
she ever calls the police or testifies for the prosecution, are used
as mechanisms of control by countless batterers.79 These threats
77

Asserting that an accurate understanding of the dynamics of battering
should shape the contours of the forfeiture doctrine is perfectly consistent
with a commitment to a requirement that, in each particular case, an
individualized forfeiture determination must be made. See infra note 86 and
accompanying text.
78
This dynamic is one of a number of reasons that a requirement that
the defendant specifically intend to procure a witness’s absence from trial is
particularly inapt in the domestic violence context. See supra note 66 and
accompanying text (discussing judicial refusal to import this evidentiary
construct to constitutional realm).
79
See Lininger, supra note 4, at 769 (“The reasons why victims refuse
to cooperate with the prosecution are manifold, but chief among them is the
risk of reprisals by the batterers. One study found that batterers threaten
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may be explicit or implicit. They are often leveled against the
victim’s children and other family members, and they are no
less real or powerful than the classic witness tamperer’s call
from jail by virtue of having been announced prior to the crime
for which the batterer happens to be standing trial. Indeed, it is
often impossible to isolate the “tampering conduct” from the
crime itself,80 since the nature of the relationship between a
batterer and his victim often renders superfluous acts aimed
specifically at procuring trial absence.81
We see, then, that the conventional notion that someone who
witnesses a crime later becomes subject to a defendant’s efforts
to prevent her testimony is often inapt in the domestic violence
context; the chronology that comports with reality is not nearly
so linear.
B. The Problem of “What Counts”
In some cases, of course, the defendant engages in
misconduct occurring after the charged crime in a manner that

retaliatory violence in as many as half of all cases. . . .” (citing Randall
Fritzier & Lenore Simon, Creating a Domestic Violence Court: Combat in
the Trenches, 37 FAM. CT. REV. 28, 33 (2000), available at
http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/review.html)).
80
The discussion that follows tends to support the proposition that
existing criminal law definitions of domestic violence fail to capture the full
spectrum of battering conduct. See generally Tuerkheimer, Remedying the
Harm of Battering, supra note 1.
81
See supra note 2 and accompanying text. While it is often impossible
to identify a “tampering” behavior that is distinct from an abusive course of
conduct (even as a theoretical matter), this is not always the case. Many
batterers engage in efforts specifically targeted at procuring the unavailability
of the victim at trial—for instance, threatening to kill her if she cooperates
with prosecutorial efforts. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 807
(Minn. 2005) (mentioning defendant who menaced girlfriend with gun made
calls from jail threatening that “if she doesn’t do what he wants someone will
come over to her house and do something to her”). Even when a batterer
behaves in ways that correspond more closely to traditional understandings of
“tampering,” however, his actions are embedded in a relationship
characterized by the violent exercise of power.
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causes the victim’s unavailability.82 Yet here, too, the difficulty
of importing the “tampering” construct to the domestic violence
context—where the significance of a particular act is deeply
embedded in a relationship—becomes readily apparent.
In marked contrast to the archetypical tampering case, where
courts have little trouble seeing the likely effect of a murder
defendant’s call from jail threatening to kill a witness if she
testifies, the meaning ascribed by a domestic violence victim to
conduct by her abuser can rarely be understood or evaluated
without reference to the abusive relationship.83
This tension relates to a concern articulated by the lower
court in Hammon:
The question will probably also frequently arise as to
what amounts to “wrongdoing” by a defendant in
such a scenario, i.e., will only physical
“wrongdoing” (another battery) by a defendant
suffice, or can psychological pressure on a victim not
to cooperate be enough, and if so, how is such
pressure to be measured?84
This question cannot be answered in the abstract, and the
fact-dependent nature of the inquiry can hardly be overstated.
82

Here, the question of what “misconduct” constitutes a forfeiture of
confrontation rights is put in starkest relief, although the inquiry is relevant
regardless of when the (mis)conduct which caused the victim’s absence
occurred in relation to the charged crime.
83
“[R]elationship provides the terrain on which a batterer’s system of
domination is enacted; relationship is essential to grasping the full measure of
harm inflicted by the abuser and suffered by the victim; relationship connects
and organizes what might otherwise appear to be random acts.” Tuerkheimer,
Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note 1, at 973-74. See Karla Fischer
et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic
Violence Cases, 46 SMU. L. REV. 2117, 2120 (1993) (“In battering
relationships . . . cultural components become an extension of the pattern of
domination itself . . . . A gesture that seems innocent to an observer is
instantly transformed into a threatening symbol to the victim of abuse. It is a
threat that carries weight because similar threats with their corresponding
consequences have been carried out before, perhaps many times.”).
84
Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 951 n.3 (Ind. App. 2004),
vacated, 829 N.E.2d 444 (2005).
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With regard to the reasoning process itself (as opposed to its
outcome), however, it may be said that without an appreciation
of the importance of context, and a sense of the patterned nature
of battering, judicial forfeiture decisions will be unduly
restrictive. Unless the dynamics of abuse are taken into account,
the principle of forfeiture cannot be faithfully applied to
domestic violence cases. Insight into the nature of battering is
thus essential for the equitable underpinnings of the rule to be
realized.
C. Proving Forfeiture
Accepting that in many, if not most, victimless domestic
violence prosecutions a batterer’s conduct over time has caused
the victim’s unavailability does not answer the question of how
judges are to determine whether a particular defendant has
forfeited his constitutional rights.85 One fundamental requirement
is an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution has the burden
of proving that the defendant’s misconduct caused the victim’s
unavailability.86 In my prosecutorial experience, many victims
85

Cf. Raeder, supra note 57, at 361 (“Some prosecutors are already
arguing that domestic violence cases by their very nature involve forfeiture
when the victim does not testify. They claim defendants invariably either
actually threatened complainants or, given the circumstances of their
relationships, such women are afraid that their testimony will cause further
violence (emphasis added).”). Apropos of a concern that domestic violence
victims’ statements will be categorically immune from Confrontation Clause
challenge, Tom Lininger has aptly observed that “not every [domestic
violence] assault carries with it the threat of reprisals if the victim cooperates
with law enforcement. If courts were to presume such tampering in every
domestic violence case, the forfeiture exception would swallow the rule of
confrontation.” Tom Lininger, Yes, Virginia, There is a Confrontation
Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 401, 407 (2005).
86
Importantly, “forfeiture cannot be assumed without specific evidence
linking a defendant to a complainant’s failure to testify at trial.” Raeder,
supra note 57, at 361. “Specific evidence,” in my view, contemplates proof
of how the particular defendant on trial, by his battering conduct, caused the
victim’s unavailability. This requisite linkage should go some way to
alleviating fears that forfeiture will be too radically expanded by a categorical
domestic violence exception to the default requirement of confrontation.
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are, at some point in the process, quite candid about their
reasons for wishing charges to be “dropped”; their hearsay
statements are generally admissible at a forfeiture hearing.87
Other evidence might include orders of protection, family court
petitions and transcripts, prior police reports, and expert
testimony on the effects of battering.88
In many victimless prosecutions, provided an accurate
judicial conception of what may constitute forfeiture, the burden
of proving that the defendant’s misconduct procured the
complainant’s trial absence will be satisfied.89 Yet Crawford and
its progeny present domestic violence prosecutors with a difficult
dilemma: in order to successfully advance a forfeiture argument,
extreme measures to procure the victim’s trial attendance may
be required.90 As understandings of forfeiture in the battering
realm evolve, the law regarding witness unavailability may
concomitantly develop in a manner that accounts for the
particularities of domestic violence.91 But in the meantime, in
87

FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (in making a determination regarding questions
of admissibility, the court “is not bound by the rules of evidence except those
with respect to privileges.”).
88
See Adam M. Krischer, “Though Justice May be Blind, It Is Not
Stupid”: Applying Common Sense to Crawford in Domestic Violence Cases,
38 PROSECUTOR 14, 15 (2004) (describing various other ways of proving a
batterer’s responsibility for procuring victim unavailability, including prison
phone records, jailhouse phone recordings, voicemail messages, e-mail, and
eyewitnesses to threats).
89
Even so, as litigation strategies shift in the wake of Davis, the
prosecutorial resources which will be expended to prove forfeiture should not
be underestimated. See Raeder, supra note 57, at 364-65 (discussing costs
associated with proving forfeiture, and questioning “whether such resources
would be available for misdemeanors, which encompass a large percentage of
the domestic violence caseload”).
90
Again, a judicial determination that a defendant forfeited his right of
confrontation requires a finding of witness unavailability. See supra note 59
and accompanying text.
91
Without purporting to resolve the issue, it is worth observing that
what “reasonableness” requires in the domestic violence context may be
distinct. More specifically, the “reasonableness” of prosecutorial efforts to
secure the trial participation of a domestic violence victim may be partly
dependent on whether the dynamics of battering warrant any degree of
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many victimless prosecutions, these necessary measures to
procure a victim’s presence at trial will be undertaken⎯often
reluctantly, and often unsuccessfully⎯forcing judges to apply an
equitable doctrine to conduct that is in essence different from
crimes that occupy a more historically privileged, less equivocal
place in our criminal justice system.92
A meaningful rule of forfeiture contemplates these
distinguishing features and acknowledges their incompatibility
with the traditional forfeiture framework, contesting law’s
systemic inattention to relationship.93 Application of forfeiture
principles to domestic violence thus requires no radical
reworking of doctrinal foundations. Rather, the potential for a
reasoned forfeiture analysis lies in enhanced judicial
understanding of the underlying facts and a willingness to accept
the obsolescence of conventional witness tampering paradigms.

deference to the victim’s expression of non-cooperation. Must a prosecutor
subpoena a victim for trial in order to satisfy the “unavailability” prong of
forfeiture analysis? If a victim fails to appear in response to a subpoena, must
she be arrested and brought to court? Must a subpoenaed victim be arrested
in anticipation of her testimony? These questions are not simply academic:
after Crawford, prosecutors are increasingly relying on material witness
warrants to ensure the availability of victims at trial. See Lininger,
Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, supra note 4, at 1365 n. 70. Whether
the “unavailability” component of the Confrontation Clause analysis should
be analyzed differently in domestic violence cases is a question with which
courts and commentators will likely grapple for some time.
92
See supra note 1; Tuerkheimer, Remedying the Harm of Battering,
supra note 1, at 969-71.
93
For a forfeiture analysis that reflects judicial awareness of these
dynamics, see People v. Santiago, No. 2725-02, 2003 WL 21507176 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. April 7, 2003). With the sole exception of Santiago (which was
decided before Crawford), I have found no written opinion in a domestic
violence case that conceptualizes forfeiture in the manner that I am
advocating.
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IV. A RELATIONAL APPROACH TO THE CONFRONTATION RIGHT
LOSS

AND ITS

The approach to confrontation that this Article has described
may best be characterized as “relational.”94 As a method of
analyzing what the right of confrontation entails, the relational
question is critical in prosecutions involving domestic violence.
When engaging in the threshold “testimonial” inquiry, taking
into account the dynamics of domestic abuse challenges
conventional notions of exigency derived from and related to
paradigmatic crime between strangers. Consideration of the
relational question yields a similar reconfiguration of doctrinal
parameters in the forfeiture area, where precedent and analogy
are inadequate to the task of implementing the equitable
principles underlying the rule. A relational view of forfeiture
requires contemplation of the connection between the defendant
and victim when determining whether the defendant’s
misconduct caused the victim’s unavailability at trial. Attending
to the context of the relationship essential to battering thus
impacts how the confrontation right is operationalized, a matter
of great import to the future prosecution of domestic violence.
More broadly, a relational approach also may influence how
we view the meaning of the confrontation right. By synthesizing
my critiques of the “testimonial” inquiry and of the forfeiture
doctrine, an understanding of the right that is itself relational in
nature emerges. In conclusion, I offer an outline of the
normative implications of this argument.
The meaning of confrontation is largely dependent on the
configuration of relationships between the accuser, state, and
accused—a variable scarcely noticed by courts or commentators.
Theories of confrontation do not remark on this triangle
(accused-accuser-state), which implicitly frames the conceptual
analysis. Rather, Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and
scholarship tend to presume particular alliances: accuser with
state against accused.
94

See supra note 8 (qualifying use of “relational”).
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We can see how integral this default arrangement is to the
“paradigmatic Confrontation Clause violation” suffered by Sir
Walter Raleigh.95 In the case against Raleigh, the relationship
between the state and accuser was such that the prosecution
could very well have produced Lord Cobham, the quintessential
accuser, to testify. Tacitly invoking this alliance, Raleigh
argued, “[I]t is strange to see how you press me still with my
Lord Cobham, and yet will not produce him . . . . He is in the
house hard by, and may soon be brought hither; let him be
produced . . .”96
In prosecutions for paradigmatic crime, the relational triangle
may be generally characterized in this manner: the accuser is “in
the house hard by;” or aligned with the state against the
accused. In the victimless domestic violence realm, however, the
same cannot be said. Indeed, quite the opposite is true: in most
cases where the prosecution is proceeding without a victim,97
allegiances underlying the relational triad are essentially
inverted; the accuser is metaphorically, and often physically, in
the house with the accused. This inversion has real consequences
for the functioning of the confrontation right.
Fundamentally, what it means to be an “accuser”98 may be
95

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004) (noting that the
Confrontation Clause “was directed [at] . . . notorious treason cases like
Raleigh’s;” “Raleigh’s trial has long been thought a paradigmatic
confrontation violation.”).
96
DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 427 (1832). In the alternative:
JOHN GEORGE PHILLIMORE, THE HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 157-58 (1850).
97
In the vast majority of victimless prosecutions, it is the preferences of
domestic violence victims, as opposed to the strategic maneuvering of
prosecutors, that drive this aspect of prosecutorial decision-making. See supra
note 4 (noting high percentage of uncooperative domestic violence victims).
98
See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 (2006). Cf. Robert
P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 UNIV. RICH. L. REV. 511, 514 n. 18 (2005).
Robert Mosteller observes:
Somewhat inexplicably, in my judgment, one aspect that
[Crawford’s] historical treatment and preliminary definition
leaves out is my particular focus on accusers and accusatory
statements, as opposed to testimonial statements. I believe there
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different when the witness is a victim of domestic violence as
inquiry into the “testimonial” nature of a statement shows.
Consistent with the conventional model of crime—which also
seems to resonate with the Crawford majority99—the providing
of information regarding past criminal conduct to law
enforcement transforms a victim/witness into an accuser. By
participating in an effort to apprehend (and, therefore,
prosecute) the perpetrator, she has allied herself with the state,
thus triggering attendant obligations under the Confrontation
Clause.100
should be a role for the concept of ‘accusatory’ hearsay in the
analysis because it better describes the core concern of the
Confrontation Clause than does the testimonial concept . . . . On
the other hand, I recognize that the decisional moment has been
reached and that, despite my arguments, the concept of
testimonial statements, rather than accusatory hearsay or
accusatory statements, has been the dominant paradigm.
Moreover, if testimonial is defined using the amicus definition in
Crawford and, appropriately interpreted, it will include most
accusatory hearsay. (citation omitted) Thus, I focus on
testimonial statements. Nevertheless, I believe the concept of
accusatory statements is quite useful in helping to identify those
statements that should be identified as testimonial.
Id.
99

See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (“An accuser who makes a formal
statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who
makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not. The constitutional text,
like the history underlying the common-law right of confrontation, thus
reflects an especially acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court
statement.”).
100
In support of his position that the conduct of the declarant, as
opposed to the participation of a government agent, renders a statement
testimonial, Richard Friedman has made the following helpful observation:
If . . . the source of the information is a human who does
understand its likely use, we can say that she was playing a
conscious, knowing role in the criminal justice system,
providing information with the anticipation that it would be used
in prosecution - and that certainly sounds a lot like testifying.
Furthermore, without such understanding on the part of the
declarant, the situation lacks the moral component allowing the
judicial system to say in effect, “You have provided information
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In most domestic violence cases, as we have seen, no such
alliance inheres in a victim’s invocation of the law enforcement
apparatus. Viewed narrowly, a battered woman who recounts a
criminal incident to police may be considered an “accuser”; but
her actions have a different meaning when seen in context.
Classifying this type of hearsay as nontestimonial reflects
awareness that a domestic violence victim has not permanently
shifted her allegiance from the defendant by asking for police
protection and, accordingly, that she is not an “accuser” in the
Confrontation Clause sense of the word.
A similar theoretical claim may be articulated with respect to
a reconceived forfeiture doctrine. The contextualized judicial
determination that I have urged asks whether the alliances
underlying the conventional relational triad have been inverted
and, if so, whether the defendant’s battering behavior is causal
in the shift. If so, he may not assert a Confrontation Clause
challenge; the default mandate of state production of the
“accuser” makes little sense where the accused’s own
misbehavior is responsible for perverting the paradigmatic
relational structure.
Crawford teaches that confrontation has a function beyond
ensuring the reliability of evidence.101 While theoretical
perspectives on the value of the right are varied,102 I contend
that the identification of a relational triangle has implications
across the conceptual spectrum, enhancing our understanding of
how best to advance whatever the chosen norm. Across
with the knowledge that it may help convict a person. If that is
to happen, our system imposes upon you the obligation of taking
an oath, saying what you have to say in the presence of the
accused, and answering questions put to you on his behalf.”
Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of Testimonial, 71
BROOK. L. REV. 241, 259 (2005).
101
See Crawford, 546 U.S. at 61.
102
See Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle, supra note 4, at 59-61
(summarizing various normative perspectives on the right of confrontation,
including the individual dignity theory, the “accuser/obligation” approach,
the limited government model, and a utilitarian “truth seeking” understanding
of the right.).

TUERKHEIMER

6/22/2007 1:12 AM

RELATIONAL APPROACH TO CONFRONTATION

757

theoretical orientations, a relational perspective speaks to what
implementation of the confrontation right requires.103
CONCLUSION
The departure of domestic violence from a traditional crime
archetype shows that a particular vision of relationships has,
until now, animated our sense of what the Constitution requires.
Toward the end of discerning whether confrontation furthers its
intended normative purpose, a relational inquiry reveals that the
meaning of “absent accuser” is distinct in the battering context.
Similarly, a relational approach to forfeiture contemplates
whether, by his battering behavior, a defendant has reconfigured
the conventional alignment of the accused-accuser-state triad. By
exposing a conceptual triangle that frames Confrontation Clause
challenges, the relational insight thus advances our
understanding of the confrontation right and how its promise
may best be realized.

103

For application of this argument to competing visions of the function
of confrontation, see id.

